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Enterprise reform is emerging as the core created by diffuse ownership and conflicts over economic problem in Eastern Europe. As privatcontrol that exist before privatization. Regular ization has been delayed, a new problem has cash auctions may fail to match managers and emerged, largely unanticipated by outside capital stock efficiently because of pervasive advisers: It is probably possible to run a clear-cut wealth constraints. Standard advice on enterprise state enterprise efficiently, and it is certainly restructuring does not allow for the sheer scale of possible to get efficient perfonnance from a the problem or the special reasons why, in private enterprise. But it is utterly impossible to Eastern Europe, current profits are a poor guide get anything like efficiency from an enterprise to potential profitability. Simply applying for which the current and future ownership status Westem bankruptcy procedures based on current are in limbo. What has happened in Poland, data about enterprise profitability introduces a where reform started earlier than elsewhere, is destructive bias toward liquidation and delay. probably a harbinger of things to come.
And, argues van Wijnbergen, introducing Two years after the crumbling of central Western style unemployment insurance, alauthority that used to exercise both ownership though it would lower the social costs of unemand control, ownership of ntnte-owned enterployment, could also contribute to its indefinite prises remains ineffective and control diffuse.
extension. Lacking sharply defined control rights, various groups (workers, incumbent managers, and local Van Wijnbergen sketches how these probauthorities) often had no other way of demonlems can be addressed by incorporating all the strating their clout than by disrupting the enterincentive problems specific to Eastem Europe prise. And with changes in ownership announced into the design of the policies to be implemented. but not implemented, managers and workers Sometimes the advice that results is novel and as councils alike have every incentive to yet untried; sometimes examples exist of its decapitalize the enterprise and increase its debts. successful implementation. But the altemative is a long period of declining incomes and, presumEastern Europe is not well served with ably, increasing social unrest as the consensus straight textbook advice. The common wisdom underlying the reform programs begins to erode. on privatizadtion fails to address the problems The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseninate the fndings of work under way in the Bank. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy. Price decontrol has eliminated queues in Eastern Europe within a matter of weeks. What it has not done is lead the place much closer to efficient resource use. Moreover, the reforms that most economists agree are necessary to introduce production side efficiency have been surprizingly difficult to introduce. Privatization drives, after init.al successes in selling off shops, restaurants and so on, have stalled, with none of the grandiose distribution schemes anywhere near implementation (Czecho-Slovakia's voucher experiment may provide the first exception after almost two years of delays). In the mean time, output in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) has collapsed across the beard, almost independent of sectors and country of location. As a consequence, even the success stories Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary have seen GDP decline by double digit numbers in the first year central planning was abandoned.
The collapse of the SOE sector all over Eastern Europe has also dramatically increased the difficulty of macroeconomic management. Governments relied mostly on SOE profits as a source of revenue; with the decline of SOE profitability the tax base is rapidly eroding. Since introduction of efficient systems of taxation is turning out to be more time consuming than many thought, governments now face the difficult choice between cutting expenditure in line with falling taxes, the deepening recession notwithstanding, or reignite inflation through increasing reliance on the inflation tax. Moreover the widespread fear of massive unemployment once privatization proceeds in earnest is developing as a major deterrent to privatization. This problem is more acute in a recession because fired workers would have difficulty finding alternative employment while the economy is already in a slump.
Thus enterprise reform is emerging as the core economic problem in Eastern Europe. Moreover, as implementation of the privatization plans ran into delays, a new problem emerged, largely unanticipated by outside advisers.
It is probably possible to run a clear cut state enterprise efficiently, and it is certainly possible to get efficient performance from a private enterprise. What is turning out to be utterly impossible is to get anything like efficien:y from an enterprise whose current and future ownership status are in limbo. The Polish example is iikely to prove a harbinger of things to come elsewhere, as Poland's reform program started earlier than those in the rest of Central Europe and the CIS states.
Two years after the crumbling of central authority that used to exercise both ownership and control, ownership of SOEs remains ineffective and control diffuse. In the absence of sharply defined control rights, various groups (workers, incumbent managers, local authorities) often had no other way of demonstrating their clout than disrupting the enterprise. Moreover, with changes in ownership announced but not implemented, managers and workers councils alike have every incentive to decapitalise the enterprise and increase its debts. Thus wage claims have accelerated well beyond productivity increases, and two years after hyperinflation wiped out all nominal debts, 2000 out of Poland's 8000 major enterprises yet to be privatized find themselves once again unable to service their rapidly accumulating debts.
There is little doubt that this number would grow if interest capitalization on bank debt would stop.
The debt overhang problem that has been created in the past two years pretty much prevents straight privatization through auctioning. Outsiders have no way of knowing whether the firm's distress situation is due to inefficient management, due to very efficient management responding to perverse incentives or due to the fact that the firm has no prospects at its current capital structure even under the best of management practices. This means that enterprise restructuring has become unavoidable in spite of widespread agreement in the profession that this is best left to new private owners.
An additional problem concerns the financial sector's role in all this.
Western loan classification practices would show most of the banks recently split off from the central bank to be insolvent, in most cases because of the very debt servicing problems in the SOE sector I just highlighted. But banks are the major creditors of SOEs and claims on SOEs dominate the asset portfolios of the banks. These two facts make separate treatment of enterprise debt and bank recapitalization impossible. Thus a successful restructuring plan needs to address both problems jointly. The current note identifies the main outstanding issues and proposes ways of addressing them within the general framework and the current legal structure concerning privatization and debt restructuring in Eastern Europe.
II OBJECTIVES OF A SOUND RESTRUCTURING PLAN
The core objective is to restore efficient employment of industrial assets, both capital and labor. The more narrow objective of solving the debt overhang of enterprises and the portfolio quality problem in banks is a prerequisite for the wider objective. However, common sense and experience Dervis and Condon (1992) for a defense of this approach, which was followed in Hungary.
incentives to decapitalise the firm and buy off worker unrest through excessive wage increases. This suggests that all firms not permanently put under state ownership should be transformed into joint-stock companies immediately, with the intention to transfer these stocks to an effective owner in the near future. The only proper safeguard against reoccurrence of the debt problems is a substantial acceleration of the privatization effort.
For firms that currently succeed in servicing their debts, one of the many proposed privatization schemes can be considered; a positive cash flow after debt service means that a positive price is feasible through auction or possibly bilateral negotiation. Such a sale does not necessarily have to involve cash up front; a strong case can be made to also seriously consider non-cash mechanisms, such as bank funded management buy outs. Otherwise wealth constraints might limit the set of potential bidders too much, leaving out potentially better entrepreneurs because of ineffective capital markets.
However auctioning off enterprises with a heavy debt burden will most likely fail; under present management practice most of them are insolvent, which precludes straight auctioning off since a cash auction, for incentive reasons, will require a positive price. To see this, note what the effect of a negative price at a cash auction would be: a transfer to a "buyer" of a lump sum payment plus a negative net worth company (otherwise the cash payment would not be necessary to begin with). Clearly the optimal thing to do for the buyer is to simply take the money and walk away from the company; this would, with the state or state owned banks being the main creditors, once again mean state ownership. The net result would then be a cash transfer but no privatization.
Problems with auctions are exacerbated if many firms are offered at the same time. In that case the information problem for potential bidders becomes almost impossible to solve. However, the problems with negative price cash auctions do not mean tha. heavily indebted firms should not be privatized, but that their debts need to be reduced prior to privatization. Liquidation, which is often proposed for enterprises that do not generate enough cash flow to service their debts, is both infeasible in practice and likely to be excessively destructive; poor performance in many cases reflects as much distorted management incentives as real insolvency assuming sensible management incentives. A much more efficient way of debt restructuring would use the opportunity to introduce effective ownership into the process. This suggests that conversion of some of the debt into equity should be the main focal point of the restructuring exercise, rather than debt write downs and full collection of what remains. Debt equity conversion offers a more promising way towards efficient use of the assets controlled by the enterprises than liquidation into a thin capital market and a depressed economy does.
Privatization is in fact most efficiently done within the context of the debt restructuring plan. After all, debt restructuring and work outs will involve changes in the modus operandi of the firm; to make such decisions without involving the ultimate owners is likely to be inefficient in that it almost guarantees the need for further reorganizations once new owners take over. Thus there is a high priority to devising ways of bringing privatization into any debt restructuring scheme.
The situation is different for commercial banks. While there is little doubt that they need to be privatized eventually if they are to operate efficiently, the combination of de facto if not de jure deposit insurance and information asymmetries makes this industry exceptionally vulnerable to fraud.
There is now widespread consensus in the economics profession that the fastest way towards a socialized banking system is complete liberalization without effective regulation. Chile's banking collapse in 1982 after a no holds barred liberalization effort is only the best known of many such crises. On these grounds, actual privatization of the commercial banks may be best delayed until an effective regulation framework and mechanisms for enforcement of prudential rules are in place.
This also means that working towards establishing such mechanisms is of the utmost importance; a really efficient banking system cannot be expected to come in operation until that time. In the mean time, half way solutions can be implemented, following the Mexican example in financial sector reform: run the banks, while still state owned, on an "arm's length" basis until regulation is in place, at which time they can be privatized. This makes the provision of proper incentives to bank managers a particularly thorny problem. Since much of what will be proposed below hinges critically on the banks exercising effective control over their onsets, such reforms are also critical for the success of the enterprise reforms.
III PRIVATIZING PROFITABLE INDUSTRIES
There is widespread agreement that privatization is the ultimate answer to Eastern Europe's problems, and that it should be done fast. Nevertheless not a single country has been able to implement privatization at a significant scale beyond simple single establishment service sector firms. Everywhere mass privatization schemes have either been abandoned or are stalled; even Czecho-Slovakia's vouchers scheme has been delayed by almost two years. So what is it that the initial advice overlooked? Why is privatization so much more difficult than initially thought?
The initial discussions focused mostly on how to promote widespread share ownership without diluting corporate control and on whether the government should also pursue revenue objectives (Tirole (1991) ). For small establishments there is only one owner so the effective control issue does not arise. In most mass privatlzation schemes the effective control objective is Exceptions were made where dominant investors could be found, usually foreigners; in that case firms were to be kept out of the mass privatization schemes.
All this sounds well thought through and workable; so why has n't it worked? With hindsight three major issues were overlooked, each important enough in itself to block serious progress. Elements of such transfers have been built in the process in Poland, but apparently not enough and not well enough targeted. There are clear political problems with this advice; in most cases the former power brokers (the "Nomenklatura") are among the groups to be bought off. The experience so far suggests however that the costs of locking them out, even if ultimately successful, something that seems anyhow increasingly unlikely, would be prohibitive and in the end would leave everybody worse off.
The second problem stems from the employment effects of privatization.
Experience so far suggests that privatization leads to layoffs of about 50% of the work force prior to privatization. This would obviously cause dramatic problems if privatization would take place rapidly and on a massive scale and explains why workers everywhere have resisted privatization fiercely (this is especially clear in Poland). Western advice to deal with this problem through European style safety net institutions is obviously not going to resolve this problem: to leave workers anywhere near their previous level of income would lead to totally unaffordable schemes which in addition would completely destroy adjustment and labor supply incentives. We return to this issue in section VI.
The third problem is more practical than the previous two, although 
IV ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION
Straight privatizatiorn is not going to succeed for those enterprises who do not generate enough cash flow to service their current debt and leave some income for residual claimants. Those firms may however be salvageable at lower levels of debt; they are thus candidates for restructuring. This section attempts to apply the general principals laid out so far to the design of a restructuring-cum-privatization program for enterprises. The first section states key guiding principles and the second sketches two proposals that adhere to these guidelines.
IV.1 Core Issues in Debt Restructuring
A
Avoid Large Scale Liquidation 3 /
The idea that almost an entire industrial sector would be unsalvageable makes very little sense. After all a large part of GDP (which is a value added concept!) is produced in manufacturing; this means per definition that it is possible to devise a capital structure and set of wage contracts under which most of the sector can operate profitably. Moreover, it is more than likely that most of the problems are related to distorted incentive structures in the past rather than incompetent management; and even in the latter case the right solution would be to replace management, not necessarily to break up the firm.
It is true that in most of Eastern Europe firms are excessively vertically integrated, as this was often the only way secure input supplies could be arranged under central planning. But chis problem calls for splitting the firm into smaller firms during privatization 4 , not for asset stripping, which is what liquidation amounts to.
B Avold If posslble formal bankruptcy procedures;
Use of bankruptcy procedures would inevitably overload the system and lead to interminable legal delays, thus prolonging the very limbo on ownership and effective control that is behind much of the current SOE crisis to begin with. This requires more than just a decision not to use bankruptcy courts in the workout scheme. In particular, the next point needs to be resolved if excessive use of bankruptcy courts is to be avoided.
C
Resolve conflicts between credltors without triggering unnecessary liquLdation;
Any debt work out has to find a way to reconcile different creditor interests. In particular if a senior creditor imposes a solution seen to be unfair or less favorable than straight liquidation by another creditor, that other creditor will derail the program by triggering bankruptcy procedures. This is a major issue, since the bankruptcy courts clearly cannot handle say 2000 companies within 6 months. Thus the work out scheme needs to incorporate mechanisms of resolving creditor conflicts that will not trigger excessive liquidation proceed1i.,s.5
5 This is one of the objections against the Begg-Portes (1992) proposal to take loans to loss making SOEs off the banks' books and put them back in the Government to auction them off to whomever wishes to collect on them. Their proposal pays no attention to the creditor conflict issue at all and thus is likely to lead to inaction and delays on enterprise restructuring. Another reason to expect that is that in their proposal the initiative for enterprise restructuring is again put back with the Government in a centralized approach. But of course most governments have already demonstrated that they cannot really come to grips with these problems.
D
Malntaln lncentives to ao_ unload debt to the government;
Debt write-offs should be just enough to restore solvency, but not more than that. In particular excessive unloading of bank and interenterprise debt onto the government will add to an already extremely difficult macromanagement problem. Servicing the debt so created would require additional tax measures while the current system is already strained to the limits to finance current expenditure plans in a non-inflationary manner. Thus debt restructuring should be costly to management and commercial banks.
E
Bias Debt RestructurLng towards Debt/Equity ConversLon;
This has been a trend in bankruptcy reform all over the Western world.
D/E conversion allows the firm to continue as a going concern and avoids the firesale problems associated with liquidation. A creditor is always better off with a D/E conversion than if it writes the loans off; equity cannot fall below zero so is at worst equivalent to a write off, but if the firm's fortunes improve, the creditor will share in the upswing. It will also simplify turning the debt restructuring into a privatization device.
F
Reserve a Substantial Role for the Commercial Banks In the Process;
It is arguable that having the government or one of its agencies as the "agent of change" in privatization or restructuring will lead to considerable delays. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to structure incentives in such a way that middle level officials, who will actually have to implement any scheme, find it in their interest to cooperate. It is possible (and very important!) to provide such incentives to bank managers (cf Section V.3).
An additional argument to rely on banks as the "agents of change" is that through their existing customer relation they are best placed to judge the potential of a firm and thus the merits of a particular restructuring plan. The objection that banks do not have the skills to do this right, even if true, is less compelling than it seems at first sight. The point is not that banks are good at doing this, but that they are likely to be better than anybody else, in particular better than the government.
Concentrating substantial ownership of equity in the commercial banks causes regulatory problems; in particular it is difficult to evaluate the equity for capital adequacy calculations, since it is likely to remain nontraded in most cases. This means that over time equity in bank portfolios may have to be sold off, which could be done through providing only temporary wavers from exposure limits. However converting much bank debt into equity creates concentrated share ownership which has one big plus point: at least one group of shareholders has the ability and incentives to actively monitor managers. The regulatory problem is likely to be minor for some time if banks are recapitalized up front on the basis of a conservative assessment of the status of the loan that is to be converted into equity. And as time goes by and the regulatory problem grows, the banks can be made to sell off the equity gradually. To avoid the firesale problems associated with instantaneous liquidation, a substantial time period should be allowed for this, in the order of say five years.
IV.2 Two Practical Proposals
In what follows I outline two proposals for restructuring; both ultimately aim at debt-to-equity conversion, but each takes a different approach to the problems created by the existence of multiple creditors with different seniority. Typically, creditors can be subdivided in three classes:
one, and most senior, the government through tax arrears, social security claims and so on. Two, bank credit and secured non-bank creditors; three, interenterprise credits. At the bottom of all this are the ultimate owners, in this case the government or a government-run agency. The two proposals diftw'r in their approach to resolving creditor conflicts. But both aim at privatization of the restructured enterprise, and both rely heavily on the commercial banks to resolve the administrative capacity constraints on privatization agencies. Both also explicitly allow for non-cash bids, an important feature in the presence of pervasive wealth constraints and imperfect capital markets (without which wealth constraints would be a nonissue).
A
An Unfamiliar but Almost Perfect Approach: Taking a Cue from Recent
Proposals for Bankruptcy Reform
Bankruptcy reform throughout the Western world has attempted to remove the liquidation bias from regular bankruptcy proceedings. In most cases, firms, once properly managed, will be worth much more than the resale value of their underlying ir.dividual assets. Thus there is an incentive to maintain the firm as a going concern, or at least maintain potentially successful subdivisions as going concerns. The approach sketched below modifies a recent proposal for bankruptcy reform so as to turn it into a method for restructuring-cum-privatization (cf Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) .
The proposal is designed to reach three objectives:
-A Achieve fast clarification of ownership and control through privatization;
-B Provide a mechanism for resolving creditor conflicts during the debt work out;
-C Do all this as part of the debt restructuring scheme.
The latter is important to avoid destructive outcomes of the work out scheme.
The proposal consists of two parts, a way of soliciting reorganization proposals and a method of debt and capital restructuring. The method of debt restructuring is best explained by example. Take the case of two creditors:
for example tax arrears and a commercial bank, say of 100 $ and 200 $ each respectively (a structurally similar approach should be followed in the case of more than two classes of creditors). The debt restructuring scheme implies four steps, to be implemented simultaneously: 1 A complete write-off of all debts; 2 Creation of equity (in this case 100 shares of 1$) all of which goes to the senior creditor. i..e. in this case the government. This is an important feature; incumbent management is typically best informed about the firm's potential but may be wealth-constrained and so unable to compete in a regular all-cash auction. In fact non-cash MBOs have a second advantage: they reintroduce some debt in the new capital structure of the firm. This is important as a disciplining device on management in periods of financial distress (Dewatripont and Tirole (1992) In fact one way of looking at keeping such loss makers temporarily afloat is as a sort of workfare; since the alternative is unemployment, the government could consider keeping the workers at least productively engaged.
As long as they produce enough value added to pay the excess of their own wages over what they would cost the government in unemployment pay, 6/ the government comes out ahead from a fiscal point of view.
The argument against such schemes is the same that has been levied against workfare in the US: by providing dead-end jobs only, workers are not really re-integrated in the economy and may in fact be discouraged from trying to be, since their income hinges on not moving away from where they currently are. The latter disincentive is of course singularly strong when a whole region is affected, unfortunately frequently the case in Eastern Europe.
Thus shielding large enterprises or regionally dominant employers from closure may be efficient compared to the alternative, but only temporarily so.
But commercial banks may be singularly ill-suited to implement gradual closure. If the enterprise is big enough to effectively blackmail the government in not closing it down now, there is no reason to expect that a commercial bank (or for that matter the government itself) will be any more successful later. Simply imposing cash constraints is unlikely to be a credible threat; once again, if the government can be blackmailed in putting up the cash now, why should the firm not succeed again once the first allotment runs out?
The special nature of the problem first of all suggests that management of these "workfare firms" should be transferred to an agency that is keenly aware of budget constraints, such as the finance ministry; and second that part of the winding down of the firms should be a major effort to retrain the work force and assist it in finding alternative employment, housing and so on so as to reduce incentives to block closure in ;he future. Absent such an job search and retraining assistance program, claims of support being only temporary are simply not credible and will almost certainly be broken. The solution is straightforward: access to workfare status (or into the intervention fund) should be made conditional on:
A/ all junior creditors relinquishing their claims; B/ harsh adjustment measures for both workers and managers, such as mandatory lay-offs, wage freezes, and replacement of top management.
Condition A maintains the incentive for banks to reach a restructuring package that will keep the enterprise out of the intervention fund; and condition B maintains the incentive for workers and managers to cooperate in this attempt.
If either one is not imposed before any money is handed out, the creation of an intervention fund will destroy any chance of success of reaching restructuring agreements through the banks or even management buy-outs.
Budgetary control over the process will then become impossible to maintain and the privatization objective will be lost.
V CONMERCIAL BANK REGULATION AND INCENTIVES
One important caveat attaches to both proposals outlined above: the schemes rely heavily on proper functioning of the commercial banks. It cannot be stressed enough that fast and substantial progress on the implementation of effective mechanisms of bank supervision is going to be absolutely essential for the success of the scheme. 8 The chaos among the recently created private banks in Poland demonstrates that point dramatically.
Proper functioning of commercial banks in turn requires at least three things, each discussed in turn.
V.1 Regulation
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of prudential regulation.
Any business that starts with taking the customers' money up front instead of after delivered services is potentially prone to fraud. Such problems may range from direct fraud (insider lending) to excessive risk taking by managers, especially if their down side risk is partially covered by de facto deposit insurance. Experience in Chile with unregulated privatization clearly indicates that a major crisis is the unavoidable outcome of an unregulated privatized banking system. Thus privatization of commercial banks should proceed cautiously if at all as long as effective regulatory mechanisms are not in place.
An effective regulatory framework requires first of all implementation of a loan classification and general portfolio assessment system to provide regulators with the necessary warning signals. Such a reporting system needs to be backed up by occasional in depth on site audits to check on compliance and provide a more in depth assessment than mechanical indicators can yield.
Such audits are also necessary to safeguard against fraudulent practices such as lending to insiders while disregarding normal standards of prudence. The latter danger is particularly acute if banks can be owned by industrial groups; for that reason many countries explicitly forbid any industrial enterprise to own a bank.
Second, rules and institutions need to be set up, and the people necessary to operate them recruited and trained. Who collects information, implements rules, sets capital adequacy guidelines, rules in ambiguous cases and so on? In many cases these tasks fall to the central bank which anyhow has to deal with the banks because of its conduct of monetary policy.
V.2 Enforcement of Prudential Regulation
A regulatory framework is of little use if compliance is not enforced.
This raises two issues. Fist, what is the proper medium term framework for enforcement. Second, since both state owned and private banks are right now far out of compliance with almost any reasonable set of prudential rules, how to deal with the current situation?
A
Issues In the design of enforcement mechanisms
The main problem with enforcement mechanisms is how to make it as insensitive as possible agai.nst political intervention and direct attempts at fraudulent manipulation. Many countries feel that leaving enforcement in the hands of one institution leaves that institution too vulnerable to such pressures. This is especially the case if that institution also is responsible for implementing the prudential regulation, since that actually gives it the tools to circumvent the rules if pressured to do so. Moreover, supervision authorities may very well be tempted to cover up past supervision failures in the hope that a reversal of the problem bank's fortunes will get the bank and the supervision authorities off the hook. A banking commission usually establish supervision work programs and make enforcement decisions, but relies on Central Bank staff to carry out technical work.There is little doubt that such a commission, on which several agencies are represented, is more difficult to manipulate than an institution where authority in the end rests with one person.
B
Recapitalizing banks
Bank managers cannot be made responsive to capital value of the bank if there is no capital to begin with. Thus an essential element of banking reform is recapitalization of the banks with enough income earning assets to leave a prudential capital base in place after provisioning for bad loans.
Recapitalization through a prolo: ged pericd of high spreads between lending and borrowing rates is inefficient; it takes too long and, more importantly, works by taxing succesful firms to fund the losses of the unsuccesful enterprizes. This procedure could well abort private sector growth before it even starts. An once-off capital infusion based on public debt issue would allow a less destructive way of financing the resulting liabilities.
If bank recapitalization is part of an overall banking reform-cumenterprize-restructuring plan, as proposed in Poland, it is crucial to do the recapitalization up front, on an ex ante basis, even if it then has to be based on an imperfect assessment of the true value of the loan portfolio. 9 If not, all incentives for the commercial banks to collect anything at all on their claims will be destroyed: with recapitalization ex post, every dollar written off will be replaced by the government with an interest earning asset, so the banks have no incentive at all to try to collect or even to take equity stakes.
Objections to such a recapitalization because of the funding requirements and associated fiscal costs are always misplaced. The crucial 9 Because of the difficulty of assessing loan status, Begg and Portes (1992) propose to simply remove all loans to SOEs from the banks' books. Because of the predominance of such loans in bank portfolios, this approach basically restores the old communist practice of direct government lending to the industrial sector, bypassing intermediaries. It would also vastly overcapitalise banks; e.g. in Poland external, Western auditors after three consecutive audits place the percentage of bad loans at at most 30% in aggregate. Note that under the approach proposed here, it only matters to get the aggregate loan quality roughly right, not every individual loan; given the incentive to exaggerate losses and the resulting conservative bias in standard audit procedures, that does not seem impossible.
point is that such a recapitalization is nothing but a recognition of debts that have already been incurred in the past and thus requires no budgetary allocation (the interest on the debt instruments created of course does). The argument against keeping such debts off-the-books, which is what a failure to recapitalize sufficiently would do, is that doing so unavoidably leads to unpredictable but highly inefficient ways of servicing the implicit debt. In fact in most cases undercapitalized banks end up being funded through the inflation tax as losses are picked up by the Central Bank. At least when the debts are recognized and their interest costs brought in the budget, an efficient tax structure can be set up to finance those costs.
A more interesting objection is raised by Frydman et alii (1992) . They argue that any injection of capital should go to new banks rather than the old ones. They propose to transfer liabilities of the old banks to offset the book value of the bad loans to be removed from their balance sheets, and use any issue of new debt to capitalise the new banks. They base this view on the claim that even privatization of the old banks will not provide enough of an incentive to bank managers to change their ways. This is in the end a judgment issue; but it is hard to see why, if proper incentives are important enough to completely restructure the economy, it is nevertheless reasonable to assume that that applies to everybody except managers of existing banks. Certainly the experience in Mexico with banking reform strongly supports the approach taken in this paper. 10 10 A more important objection to Frydman e.a. (1992) , and a similar plan proposed in Coricelli and Thorn (1992) , is that they too transfer responsibility for disciplining state enterprises back to the Government. Like Begg and Portes (1992) , they propose simple auctioning off of those claims as a disciplining device. For reasons explained before, this is likely to be ineffective (cf FN 5 Efforts to solve this problem through tax incentives (subsidizing firms that hire graduates of training programs) have tended to produce only short term relief; Belgian experience with this approach is that trainees get fired once the tax benefits run out. An alternative approach is tried in Mexico, where companies organize the training with government subsidies and technical assistance; in this set up, jobs are assured since the firm, which has to share in the costs by paying the worker a wage while on training, presumably would not make this investment unless it intends to reap the benefits in the future. Paying workers while on training also builds an element of income support into the program.
Making firms share in the costs increases the chance that the training will be properly directed, but raises the informational problems mentioned before. After all, such cost sharing comes from new employers, not from the old, so the match between worker and firm still needs to be made. This is in particular a problem if regional location of old and new firms are different.
Plans in Mexico to deal with this issue call for integration of data bases of regional employment offices, and national advertizing of vacancies (put in practice mostly by larger firms).
Japan follows a different approach to this issue. In large diversified industrial groups the match can be made internally, and the companies own training facilities are typically used. The government itself has set up hundreds of training centers for use of smaller and less diversified firms.
Moreover, contrary to practice elsewhere, Japanese firms have to pay a large share of the wages of laid off workers, and therefore have a strong incentive to assist laid off workers in finding jobs elsewhere. It is not uncommon for firms to actually contact target firms and make arrangements for salary transfers on condition that the new firm takes over some of the redundant workers of the old one.
B
Capital Market Interventions
Any move into new industries or different lines of work by either firms or workers will likely start out with a period of low or negative cash flows.
This could be because of retraining expenses or job search by workers, need for relocation, retooling or investment outlays by firms. This implies that access to credit is particularly important. Unfortunately, reorientation both means a decline in value of current assets and therefore diminished collateralization possibilities, and at the same time higher uncertainty about future earnings. Thus access to credit markets is likely to be impaired at the very time it is most needed. This problem is most severe for individual workers or self employed, and for small and medium firms. 
C Public Investment Programs and Regional Targeting
There is now increasing evidence of complementarity between public investment in infrastructure and private investment. Roads towards a village increase the chances that somebody will build a plant in that village. Thus private investment response could well be stronger if public investment in infrastructure is to some extent shielded from the budget cutting that fiscal sustainability usually requires. Public sector investment projects geared towards private sector productivity improvement (by better roads, access to electricity, investment in training facilities etc.) can play a very useful role in industrial policy packages; during implementation labor is absorbed, while a positive impact on private productivity means that private demand for labor increases once the projects are finished, typically in the same area. out of work by offering below market wages; it would allow a cheap way of building up infrastructure and thus is likely to encourage matching private investment; and finally it allows regional targeting, an important plus point given the regional structure of unemployment in most East European countries.
A particularly useful focal point would be to finance housing construction through such a program, since this would address one of the most serious barriers to mobility currently holding back labor market adjustment.
VII CONCLUSIONS
The guiding theme of this paper is that Eastern Europe is not well served with straight textbook advice. The common wisdom on privatization fails to address the problems created by the diffuse ownership and conflicts over control that exist prior to privatization. Regular cash auctions may fail to lead to the efficient matching of managers and capital stock because of pervasive wealth constraints. Standard advice on enterprise restructuring fails to incorporate the consequences of the sheer scale of the problem, and of the special reasons why, in Eastern Europe, current profits are a very poor guide to future profit opportunity. Simply applying Western bankruptcy procedures based on current data of enterprise profitability introduces a destructive bias towards liquidation and delay. Finally we argued that introduction of Western style unemployment insurance, while lowering the social costs of unemployment, would almost certainly also contribute to its indefinite extension.
We have sketched how these problems can be addressed by incorporating all the incentive problems specific to Eastern Europe into the design of the policies to be implemented. In some cases the advice that comes out is novel
and as yet untried; in some cases successful examples of its implementation exist. This means that a modicum of imagination and experimentation is unavoidable. The alternative, however, is a long period of declining incomes and, presumably, increasing social unrest as the consensus underlying the reform programs starts to erode. Thus the pay off to imaginative policy design and explicit attention to the political constraints and incentive problems specific to the region are difficult to overestimate.
